feat: /cso v2 — infrastructure-first security audit (v0.11.6.0) (#384)

* feat: /cso v2 — infrastructure-first security audit

Rewrite /cso from code-centric OWASP scanning to infrastructure-first
attack surface analysis. 15 phases covering secrets archaeology, dependency
supply chain, CI/CD pipeline security, webhook verification, LLM/AI
security, skill supply chain scanning, plus OWASP Top 10, STRIDE, and
data classification.

Key design decisions from eng review + Codex adversarial review:
- Soft gate stack detection (prioritize, don't skip)
- Error on conflicting scope flags (never silently ignore)
- Permission gate before scanning ~/.claude/skills/
- Graceful degradation when audit tools aren't installed
- Finding fingerprints for cross-run trend tracking
- Variant analysis: one verified vuln triggers codebase-wide search
- Dual confidence modes: daily (8/10 gate) vs comprehensive (2/10)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: /cso v2 acknowledgements — 10 projects that informed the design

Credits: Sentry (confidence gating), Trail of Bits (mental model + variant
analysis), Shannon/Keygraph (active verification validation), afiqiqmal
(framework detection + LLM security), Snyk ToxicSkills (skill supply chain),
Miessler PAI (incident playbooks), McGo (report format), Claude Code
Security Pack (modular validation), Anthropic CCS (500+ zero-days), and
@gus_argon (v1 blind spot identification).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: /cso v2 E2E tests — full audit, diff mode, infra scope

Three E2E test cases with planted vulnerabilities:
- cso-full-audit: hardcoded API key + .env tracked by git
- cso-diff-mode: webhook without signature verification on feature branch
- cso-infra-scope: unpinned GitHub Action + Dockerfile without USER

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: /cso E2E tests — correct logCost and recordE2E signatures

logCost requires (label, result), recordE2E requires (collector, name,
suite, result). Fixed all 3 test cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: /cso infra E2E test — increase timeout to 360s

The infra scope test runs Agent sub-tasks for parallel finding
verification which can take longer than 240s. Increased maxTurns
from 25 to 60 and timeout from 240s to 360s.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: /cso infra E2E test — sharper prompt to prevent exploration waste

The agent was burning 30+ turns exploring a 3-file repo (18 Glob calls,
Explore subagent, 4 SKILL.md reads) before starting the audit. Two Agent
verification subagents then ate ~100s, causing the 240s timeout.

Fix: tell the agent the repo is tiny, list the exact files, skip the
preamble, remove Agent from allowed tools, reduce maxTurns 60→30.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.11.6.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address Codex adversarial findings in /cso v2

Six fixes from Codex adversarial review:

1. Phase 2: Use `git log -G` (regex) instead of `-S` (literal) for
   patterns with alternation (ghp_|gho_|github_pat_, etc.)

2. Phase 12 exclusion #5: Add exception so CI/CD pipeline findings
   from Phase 4 are never auto-discarded when --infra is active

3. Phase 12 exclusion #6: Add exception that unpinned actions and
   missing CODEOWNERS are concrete risks, not "missing hardening"

4. Phase 12 exclusion #15: Add exception that SKILL.md files are
   executable prompt code, not documentation — Phase 8 findings
   in SKILL.md must not be excluded

5. Phase 12 exclusion #1: Add exception that LLM cost/spend
   amplification from Phase 7 is financial risk, not DoS

6. E2E tests: Add exitReason === 'success' assertion to all 3 tests;
   move finalizeEvalCollector to file-level afterAll

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

fix: community security + stability fixes (wave 1) (#325)

* feat: add /cso skill — OWASP Top 10 + STRIDE security audit

* fix: harden gstack-slug against shell injection via eval

Whitelist safe characters (a-zA-Z0-9._-) in SLUG and BRANCH output
to prevent shell metacharacter injection when used with eval.

Only affects self-hosted git servers with lax naming rules — GitHub
and GitLab enforce safe characters already. Defense-in-depth.

* fix(security): sanitize gstack-slug output against shell injection

The gstack-slug script is consumed via eval $(gstack-slug) throughout
skill templates. If a git remote URL contains shell metacharacters
like $(), backticks, or semicolons, they would be executed by eval.

Fix: strip all characters except [a-zA-Z0-9._-] from both SLUG and
BRANCH before output. This preserves normal values while neutralizing
any injection payload in malicious remote URLs.

Before: eval $(gstack-slug) with remote "foo/bar$(rm -rf /)" → executes rm
After:  eval $(gstack-slug) with remote "foo/bar$(rm -rf /)" → SLUG=foo-barrm-rf-

* fix(security): redact sensitive values in storage command output

The browse `storage` command dumps all localStorage and sessionStorage
as JSON. This can expose tokens, API keys, JWTs, and session credentials
in QA reports and agent transcripts.

Fix: redact values where the key matches sensitive patterns (token,
secret, key, password, auth, jwt, csrf) or the value starts with known
credential prefixes (eyJ for JWT, sk- for Stripe, ghp_ for GitHub, etc.).

Redacted values show length to aid debugging: [REDACTED — 128 chars]

* fix(browse): kill old server before restart to prevent orphaned chromium processes

When the health check fails or the server connection drops, `ensureServer()`
and `sendCommand()` would call `startServer()` without first killing the
previous server process. This left orphaned `chrome-headless-shell` renderer
processes running at ~120% CPU each.

After several reconnect cycles (e.g. pages that crash during hydration or
trigger hard navigations via `window.location.href`), dozens of zombie
chromium processes accumulate and exhaust system resources.

Fix: call `killServer()` on the stale PID before spawning a new server in
both the `ensureServer()` unhealthy path and the `sendCommand()` connection-
lost retry path.

Fixes #294

* Fix YAML linter error: nested mapping in compact sequence entries

Having "Run: bun" inside a plain scalar is not allowed per YAML spec which states: Plain scalars must never contain the “: ” and “ #” character combinations.

This simple fix switches to block scalars (|) to eliminate the ambiguity without changing runtime behavior.

* fix(security): add Azure metadata endpoint to SSRF blocklist

Add metadata.azure.internal to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS alongside the
existing AWS/GCP endpoints. Closes the coverage gap identified in #125.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add coverage for storage redaction

Test key-based redaction (auth_token, api_key), value-based redaction
(JWT prefix, GitHub PAT prefix), pass-through for normal keys, and
length preservation in redacted output.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add community PR triage process to CONTRIBUTING.md

Document the wave-based PR triage pattern used for batching community
contributions. References PR #205 (v0.8.3) as the original example.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: adjust test key names to avoid redaction pattern collision

Rename testKey→testData and normalKey→displayName in storage tests
to avoid triggering #238's SENSITIVE_KEY regex (which matches 'key').
Also generate Codex variant of /cso skill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update project documentation for v0.9.10.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: zero-noise /cso security audits with FP filtering (v0.11.0.0)

Absorb Anthropic's security-review false positive filtering into /cso:
- 17 hard exclusions (DOS, test files, log spoofing, SSRF path-only,
  regex injection, race conditions unless concrete, etc.)
- 9 precedents (React XSS-safe, env vars trusted, client-side code
  doesn't need auth, shell scripts need concrete untrusted input path)
- 8/10 confidence gate — below threshold = don't report
- Independent sub-agent verification for each finding
- Exploit scenario requirement per finding
- Framework-aware analysis (Rails CSRF, React escaping, Angular sanitization)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: consolidate CHANGELOG — merge /cso launch + community wave into v0.11.0.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: rewrite README — lead with Karpathy quote, cut LinkedIn phrases, add /cso

Opens with the revolution (Karpathy, Steinberger/OpenClaw), keeps credentials
and LOC numbers, cuts filler phrases, adds hater bait, restores hiring block,
removes bloated "What's new" section, adds /cso to skills table and install.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cso): adversarial review fixes — FP filtering, prompt injection, language coverage

- Exclusion #10: test files must verify not imported by non-test code
- Exclusion #13: distinguish user-message AI input from system-prompt injection
- Exclusion #14: ReDoS in user-input regex IS a real CVE class, don't exclude
- Add anti-manipulation rule: ignore audit-influencing instructions in codebase
- Fix confidence gate: remove contradictory 7-8 tier, hard cutoff at 8
- Fix verifier anchoring: send only file+line, not category/description
- Add Go, PHP, Java, C#, Kotlin to grep patterns (was 4 languages, now 8)
- Add GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket endpoint detection to attack surface mapping

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(docs): correct skill counts, add /autoplan to README tables

Skill count was wrong in 3 places (said 19+7=26, said 25, actual is 28).
Added /autoplan to specialist table. Fixed troubleshooting skills list
to include all skills added since v0.7.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): DNS rebinding protection for SSRF blocklist

validateNavigationUrl is now async — resolves hostname to IP and checks
against blocked metadata IPs. Prevents DNS rebinding where evil.com
initially resolves to a safe IP, then switches to 169.254.169.254.
All callers updated to await. Tests updated for async assertions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): lockfile prevents concurrent server start races

Adds exclusive lockfile (O_CREAT|O_EXCL) around ensureServer to prevent
TOCTOU race where two CLI invocations could both kill the old server and
start new ones, leaving an orphaned chromium process. Second caller now
waits for the first to finish starting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): improve storage redaction — word-boundary keys + more value prefixes

Key regex: use underscore/dot/hyphen boundaries instead of \b (which treats
_ as word char). Now correctly redacts auth_token, session_token while
skipping keyboardShortcuts, monkeyPatch, primaryKey.

Value regex: add AWS (AKIA), Stripe (sk_live_, pk_live_), Anthropic (sk-ant-),
Google (AIza), Sendgrid (SG.), Supabase (sbp_) prefixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: migrate all remaining eval callers to source, fix stale CHANGELOG claim

5 templates and 2 bin scripts still used eval $(gstack-slug). All now use
source <(gstack-slug). Updated gstack-slug comment to match. Fixed v0.8.3
CHANGELOG entry that falsely claimed eval was fully eliminated — it was
the output sanitization that made it safe, not a calling convention change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(docs): add /autoplan to install instructions, regen skill docs

The install instruction blocks and troubleshooting section were missing
/autoplan. All three skill list locations now include the complete 28-skill
set. Regenerated codex/agents SKILL.md files to match template changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update project documentation for v0.11.0.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(cso): add disclaimer — not a substitute for professional security audits

LLMs can miss subtle vulns and produce false negatives. For production
systems with sensitive data, hire a real firm. /cso is a first pass,
not your only line of defense. Disclaimer appended to every report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Arun Kumar Thiagarajan <arunkt.bm14@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tyrone Robb <tyrone.robb@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Orkun Duman <orkun1675@gmail.com>